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CHINESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INTO
AFRICA IN THE CONTEXT OF BRICS AND
SINO-AFRICAN BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES
Catherine Elkemann* & Oliver C. Ruppel**
China is now the second largest economy in the world after the United
States of America1 and is deemed to be the most influential member of
the group of leading emerging economies, the so called BRICS partner-
ship consisting of Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and
South Africa. According to the latest World Investment Report pub-
lished by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(“UNCTAD”), China is also the second largest recipient of inward for-
eign direct investment (“IFDI”) and the third in terms of outward for-
eign direct investment (“OFDI”).2 In this context, Africa is emerging as
an important destination for China’s FDI outflows.3 Through an inter-
disciplinary approach, this article seeks to further our understanding
of the economic, political and, more importantly, the legal framework
that underlies these current developments. The article first of all pro-
vides an overview of China’s current Africa policy with regards to in-
vestment. Also, the role of BRICS is scrutinized in this context. In its
main part, the article then refers to the international law governing
* Currently working as Candidate Legal Practitioner at Law Firm Hogan Lovells
International LLP in Hamburg, Germany. She completed her Masters of Laws de-
gree (LLM) at the Faculty of Law, University of Stellenbosch (South Africa) in
2013. This article contains elements of and is predominantly based on her master’s
thesis that she has been writing under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Oliver C.
Ruppel.
** Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Stellenbosch and Director of
the Development and Rule of Law Programme (DROP), South Africa. Our grateful
thanks are due to Tina Borgmeyer and Franz Kauer for their assistance in prepar-
ing this article for publication.
1 Taking into account the countries’ nominal GDP and respective shares of global
nominal GDP. See UN Statistics Division, National Accounts Main Aggregates
Database, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp (last updated Dec. 2013).
2 United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report 2013, at
xiv, xv (2013), available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013_en
.pdf.
3 United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., Asian Foreign Direct Investment
in Africa 56 (2007), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiia20071_en.pdf
(2007); UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., GLOBAL INVESTMENT
TRENDS MONITOR (2013), available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
webdiaeia2013d6_en.pdf.
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FDI. A special emphasis is put on bilateral investment treaties that
have been concluded between China and Africa. Finally, this article
evaluates the political and legal framework of the Sino-African invest-
ment relations, taking into account various aspects ranging from envi-
ronmental concerns to human rights aspects, labour issues, and
economic development. Again, the bilateral investment treaties are
analysed in more detail.
INTRODUCTION
While commercial relations between China and Africa have
been in existence for quite some time, it is the scale and pace of
China’s trade and investment flows that is particular about the cur-
rent Chinese commercial activities in Africa.4 In addition, recently, the
BRICS partnership consisting of Brazil, the Russian Federation, In-
dia, China and South Africa became of special importance for the Sino-
African relationship. In fact, trade between the BRICS countries and
the African continent has been rising constantly, doubling since 2007
to $340 billion USD in 2012, and is projected to reach $500 billion USD
in 2015.5 To put in context, this means that the BRICS countries (ac-
counting for a combined 24%) surpassed the U.S. (17%) as Africa’s sec-
ond biggest trading partner, falling only behind the European Union
(“E.U.”), which remains Africa’s largest trading partner with 34% of
the total exports.6 BRICS countries in general are forming an increas-
ingly influential network with a growing impact on international polit-
ical and economic governance. The cooperation of BRICS members
with one another and with African nations thus provides an enormous
potential for development in the future.
Traditionally, China was seen as a host country for direct for-
eign investment, rather than being the source of it.7 But recently, Chi-
nese OFDI rose significantly in absolute terms, but also relative to
FDI.8 Starting with an outward FDI flow of $2.5 billion USD in 2002,
4 Harry G. Broadman, Chinese-African Trade and Investment: The Vanguard of
South-South Commerce in the Twenty-first Century 87, in CHINA INTO AFRICA
(2008) (Robert I. Rotberg ed.).
5 United Nations Econ. Conference for Afr., Africa-BRICS Cooperation, at iii,
available at http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/africa-brics_coop
eration_eng.pdf.
6 Id. at 10.
7 See Axel Berger, China’s New Bilateral Investment Treaty Programme: Sub-
stance, Rational and Implications for International Investment Law Making, AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. 5 (2008), available at http://www.diegdi.de/publikationen/mitarbeit
er-sonstige/article/chinas-new-bilateral-investment-treaty-programme-substance-
rational-and-implications-for-international-investment-law-making-1/.
8 Axel Berger, Investment Rules in Chinese Preferential Trade and Investment
Agreements: Is China Following the Global Trend Towards Comprehensive Agree-
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there was a massive increase to $21.1 billion USD in 2006, with a
steady growth almost edging up to $85 billion USD in 2012,9 making
China the largest OFDI investor among developing countries.10 In
2012, China’s OFDI stock in Africa reached $21.23 billion USD.11
Looking at the FDI flows from 2009 to 2012, “China’s direct invest-
ment in Africa increases from $1.44 billion to $2.52 billion,” which rep-
resents an annual growth rate of 20.5%.12 This makes Africa the
fourth most important destination of Chinese OFDI after Asia (Hong
Kong), Latin America, and the Caribbean (the British Virgin Islands
and the Cayman Islands),13 leaving behind North America and Eu-
rope.14 South Africa is the largest recipient of Chinese OFDI in Africa,
followed by Sudan, Nigeria, and Zambia.15 In 2012, China’s OFDI
stock in South Africa alone reached $4.6 billion USD.16 However, most
investment flows to Africa still come from Africa’s traditional foreign
investors like the United States, Japan, and Europe.17
Africa as a place of investment still remains one of the least
developed regions in the world. Therefore, potential investors have to
be prepared to deal with such obstacles as underdeveloped market in-
stitutions, a shortage of skilled workers, constraints on business com-
petition, and weak governance, which is even more aggravated by the
ments? (German Dev. Inst., Discussion Paper No. 7, 2013), available at http://www
.die-gdi.de/discussion-paper/article/investment-rules-in-chinese-preferential-
trade-and-investment-agreements-is-china-following-the-global-trend-towards-
comprehensive-agreement.
9 United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., FDI Statistics, http://unctad-
stat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
10 Wang Duanyong, China’s Overseas Foreign Direct Investment Risk: 2008–2009
5 (S. Afr. Inst. of Int’l Aff., Occasional Paper No. 73, 2011), available at http://www
.saiia.org.za/images/stories/pubs/occasional_papers/saia_sop_73_duanyong_2011
0125.pdf.
11 China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation, INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE
COUNCIL, CHINA (Sept. 2013), http://allafrica.com/stories/201309250592.html.
12 Id.
13 MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, CHINA, 2010 STATISTICAL BULLETIN OF CHINA’S OUT-
WARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 82–85 (2010), available at http://images.mof
com.gov.cn/hzs/accessory/201109/1316069658609.pdf.
14 Claude Sumata & The´ophile Dzaka-Kikouta, The Determinant of China’s For-
eign Direct Investment in Central Africa, African East-Asian Affairs, THE CHINA
MONITOR, June 2013, at 20, 21.
15 MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, CHINA, supra note 13; Asian Foreign Direct Invest-
ment in Africa, supra note 3, at 8.
16 World Investment Report 2013, supra note 2, at 40.
17 SANNE VAN DER LUGT ET AL., ASSESSING CHINA’S ROLE IN FOREIGN DIRECT IN-
VESTMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 9 (2011), available at http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2011/03/Final-report-CCS-March-2011-CCS.pdf.
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geographical fragmentation and the poorly developed infrastructure.18
In the worst case, investors even have to be prepared to deal with such
things as severe environmental degradation, social disruptions, vio-
lence, and civil wars.19 However, contrary to Africa’s relatively weak
economic performance, it is endowed with one of the world’s highest
concentrations of natural resources, including oil, diamonds, chro-
mium, cobalt, ores, and so forth,20 making it an attractive business
partner for China. This becomes especially apparent in the oil market.
As China’s demand for oil, for example, is constantly rising at an enor-
mous growth rate,21 it actively seeks to reduce its vulnerability to the
international oil market by encouraging investments in the African oil
sector; a sector often overlooked by western competitors.22 Thus, the
search for natural resources is deemed as the main motivation for
OFDI.23 Closely linked to that is the fact that many African countries
have implemented a set of measures as part of the Economic Recovery
Programmes (“ERP”) from the 1980s onwards, including among
others, trade liberalisation, exchange rate liberalisation (devaluation),
fiscal and monetary reforms, public enterprise reforms and de-regula-
tion of investments, labour, and prices.24 In this context, Chinese man-
ufacturers and entrepreneurs are becoming increasingly aware of the
potential that the untapped African consumer market offers.25 The Af-
rican population, currently making up roughly one billion people, is
estimated to significantly grow over the coming decades.26 This posi-
tive demographic outlook offers vast opportunities for Chinese busi-
nesses, not only because their products are usually affordable, even for
those living on less than the global poverty benchmark of $1 USD.27 In
addition, Africa’s trade pacts with the U.S. and the E.U., the African
Growth and Opportunity Act (“AGOA”), and the Economic Partnership
18 HARRY G. BROADMAN, AFRICA’S SILK ROAD 6 (2007); Broadman, supra note 4, at
92.
19 Alexis Habiyaremeye, Chinafrique, Africom, and African Natural Resources: A
Modern Scramble for Africa, 12 WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. & INT’L REL. 79 (2012).
20 Id.
21 China is now the world’s second biggest consumer of petroleum products after
the United States. See Ian Taylor, China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa, 82 J. INT’L
AFF. 938, 943 (2006).
22 Wenran Jiang, Fuelling the Dragon: Natural Resources and China’s Develop-
ment, THE CHINA Q., Sept. 2009, at 602–03.
23 Broadman, supra note 4, at 88; Jiang, supra note 22, at 602; Sumata & Dzaka-
Kikouta, supra note 14, at 18; Taylor, supra note 21, at 938.
24 Peter Kragelund, Knocking on a Wide Open Door: Chinese Investment in Africa,
122 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 479, 489 (2009).
25 IAN TAYLOR, INTERNATIONAL RELATION OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 71 (2010).
26 World Investment Report 2013, supra note 2, at 42.
27 Sanusha Naidu & Daisy Mbazima, China-Africa Relations: A New Impulse in a
Changing Continental Landscape, 40 FUTURES 748, 755 (2008).
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Agreement (“EPA”) fostered interest in Africa as an investment place,
as they offer Chinese firms the possibility to export goods at conces-
sional rates to the U.S. and the E.U. markets.28 Lately, African coun-
tries have been able to attract FDI flows in such diverse sectors such
as the financial, telecom, electricity, retail trade, light manufacturing
(apparel, footwear), and the transportation equipment sector.29
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF CHINESE FDI IN AFRICA
A. Definition of Foreign Direct Investment
This article relies on the standardised definition of FDI as
agreed upon by the members of the Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (“OECD”) Development Assistance Committee,
the OECD Benchmark Definition:
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a category of invest-
ment that reflects the objective of establishing a lasting
interest by a resident enterprise in one economy (direct
investor) with an enterprise (direct investment enter-
prise) that is resident in an economy other than that of
the direct investor. The lasting interest implies the exis-
tence of a long-term relationship between the direct in-
vestor and the direct investment enterprise and a
significant degree of influence on the management of the
enterprise. The direct or indirect ownership of 10% or
more of the voting power of an enterprise resident in one
economy by an investor resident in another economy is
evidence of such a relationship.30
The definition is not only of importance for members of the
OECD itself, but is recognized by other major international institu-
tions dealing with trade and investment.31 Usually the following com-
ponents of FDI can be identified: equity capital, reinvested earnings,
and other capital (mainly intra-company loans).32 Equity capital
means “equity in branches, all shares in subsidiaries and associates,
28 Id.
29 World Investment Report 2013, supra note 2, at xvi.
30 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign
Direct Investment 234 (2008) (alterations in original), available at http://www.oecd
.org/daf/inv/investmentstatisticsandanalysis/40193734.pdf.
31 See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL: FIFTH EDITION
86 (1993), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bopman/bopman.pdf;
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), United Nations Conf. on Trade & Dev., http://
unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Foreign-Direct-Investment-(FDI).aspx (last visited
July 20, 2014).
32 INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 31, at 87; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV., supra note 30, at 36; Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 31; Press Re-
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and other capital contributions.”33 Notably, this also includes the
“greenfield investments” and M&A transactions. Reinvested earnings
on the other hand usually comprise “the direct investor’s share of earn-
ings not distributed as dividends by subsidiaries or associates and
earnings of branches not remitted to the direct investor.”34 And finally,
other direct investment capital includes “the borrowing and lending of
funds—including debt securities and suppliers’ credits—between di-
rect investors and subsidiaries, branches and associates.”35 In this
context, subsidiaries are enterprises in which the investor has control
of more than 50% of the voting power, while associates constitute en-
terprises in which the investor has control of at least 10%, but less
than 50% of the voting power.36 These basic forms of relationships can
be extended through indirect ownerships (a series of subsidiaries or
associated enterprises) or through joint ventures (“a contractual agree-
ment between two or more parties for the purpose of executing a busi-
ness undertaking, in which the parties agree to share in the profits
and losses of the enterprise as well as the capital formation and contri-
bution of operating inputs or costs”37).38
FDI has to be distinguished from portfolio investments. Portfo-
lio investments refer to investments which do not necessarily re-
present a long-term interest.39 Direct investment relationships, by
their very nature, demand for long-term, steady financing, so that FDI
in contrast to portfolio investments always triggers management or
control of the company. Also, FDI as a private investment is usually
opposed to public funding or foreign aid. While FDI seeks to generate
monetary returns, foreign aid is provided by official agencies (mainly
nations) and is administered with the promotion of the economic devel-
opment and welfare of the developing countries as its main objective.40
Nevertheless, in practice a distinction is often difficult. For example,
in China’s case, much of the FDI is generated through alternative
ways of financing as well as by the state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”).41
lease, World Trade Organization, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, http://
www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/pr057_e.htm (last visited July 20, 2014).
33 INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 31, at 87.
34 Id. at 87, 88.
35 Id. at 88.
36 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 30, at 55.
37 Id. at 237.
38 Id. at 55.
39 MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN DI-
RECT INVESTMENT 7–8 (2004).
40 See Official Development Assistance, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage
.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
41 VAN DER LUGT ET AL., supra note 17, at 18.
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In the Chinese context ODA therefore is often linked with private in-
vestments and trade (see below).42
Reasons for foreign direct investment are manifold: While
some companies use FDI to produce the same or similar goods abroad
to access new markets (horizontal FDI), other companies try to take
advantage of the host countries’ business environment (vertical
FDI).43 This can be due to gains resulting from outsourcing labour in-
tensive production to low wage countries or in order to have access to
certain raw materials, information, or technology.44 Other reasons for
companies to invest abroad include the need to minimize or diversify
risks, integrating operations of a multi-stage production process, the
aim of protecting or making use of non-transferable knowledge, as well
as protecting and capitalizing on reputation, avoiding tariffs and quo-
tas, and finally exchange rate consideration.45 Thus, attracting FDI is
at the top of the agenda for most developing countries. In addition to
capital, it will create new jobs, bring new technology, marketing tech-
niques, and management skills.46
B. China’s Current Investment Policy Towards Africa
The rapid growth of the Chinese OFDI started with the adop-
tion of the “Going Global” strategy (“Zou-chu-qu”) that was first an-
nounced in 1998 and embedded in the Tenth Five-Year Plan on
National Economy and Social Development in 2001, and included in
every plan thereafter.47 The “Going Global” strategy (sometimes also
referred to as the “Go Out” policy) is basically a long-term, innovation-
oriented development plan, in the context of which the government
promulgated a series of regulations and circulars in order to facilitate
and encourage OFDI.48 Recognizing outward investment as necessary
for the growth of Chinese economy, Chinese policymakers encouraged
and supported key firms by offering a number of incentives and bene-
fits including tax rebates, investment insurances, direct and indirect
subsidies, and most importantly, low interest loans or export credits
from financial sources that the Chinese government controls such as
state banks.49 Especially through its Export-Import Bank (“EXIM
42 Barry van Wky, Resources for Infrastructure: China’s Role in Africa’s New Busi-
ness Landscape, THE CHINA ANALYST, Sept. 2011, at 1.
43 IMAD A. MOOSA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT – THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PRAC-
TICE 4 (2000).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 268–69.
46 Broadman, supra note 18, at 152.
47 Berger, supra note 7, at 6.
48 Ping Deng, Investing for Strategic Resources and its Rationale: The Case of Out-
ward FDI from Chinese Companies, 50 BUS. HORIZON 72 (2007).
49 Id. at 72, 73; Kragelund, supra note 24, at 485.
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Bank”), China is increasingly making use of a deal structure that is
known as the “Angola mode,” “resources for infrastructure” or “pack-
age deals”50 combining foreign aid and economic development.51 Typi-
cally, a beneficiary country receives a loan for the development of
infrastructure, including electricity generation, telecom expansion,
railway construction, and water catchments, while the repayment of
the loan is done in terms of natural resources.52 Both the contracts for
the infrastructure project, as well as the rights for extracting natural
resources are generally awarded to Chinese companies.53
In the Outward Investment Sector Direction Policy & 2006
Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Outward Investment issued
among others by the National Development and Reform Commission
(“NDRC”), the Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”), and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (“MFA”), special emphasis has been given to the fol-
lowing projects:
(1) Projects that can acquire resources or raw materials for
which there is a domestic shortage and an urgent need for
the national economic development;
(2) Projects that can promote the export of domestic products,
equipment, and technologies with competitive advantages,
as well as the export of labour service;
(3) Projects that can significantly improve China’s capacity in
technology, research, and development, and can utilize
global cutting-edge technologies, advanced management
expertise, and professionals.54
Next to these three priority areas, other official policy documents
name a fourth area relating to mergers and acquisitions that enhance
the international competitiveness of Chinese enterprises and acceler-
ate their entry into foreign markets.55
50 See generally Vivien Foster et. al, Building Bridges: China’s Growing Roles as
Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa, (World Bank Public-Private In-
frastructure Advisory Facility, Trend and Policy Options No. 5, 2009); Hannah
Edinger & Jansson Johanna, China’s ‘Angola Model’ comes to the DRC, CHINA
MONITOR, no. 34, Oct. 2008, at 4, available at  http://www.ccs.org.za/downloads/
monitors/China%20Monitor%20October%202008%20(4).pdf.
51 Wky, supra note 42, at 1.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, China, Outward Investment Sector Direction Pol-
icy & 2006 Catalogue of Industries or Guiding Outward Investment in Chinese
Outward Investment, in CHINESE OUTWARD INVESTMENT: AN EMERGENCY POLICY
FRAMEWORK 67, 67 (Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al eds., 2012).
55 See, e.g., Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, China, Circular About the Relative Is-
sues on Offering More Financing Support to Key Overseas-invested Projects, in CHI-
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In order to invest abroad, Chinese companies must first go
through an administrative procedure of examination and approval
from the MOFCOM, the NDRC, China Customs, and the State Admin-
istration of Foreign Exchange (“SAFE”) at various levels.56 This proce-
dure is mainly regulated in the 2009 Measures for Overseas
Investment Management, which the MOFCOM issued (annulling the
2004 Provisions on the Examination and Approval of Investment to
Run Enterprises Abroad). Depending on the category of the projects
(resource exploitation project or non-resource exploitation) and on the
size of the project, the approval can be either granted by the central or
the provincial government.57
Through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (“FOCAC”),
China is furthermore stressing the element of cooperation with the Af-
rican continent regarding their mutual investment relations. The first
forum was held in October 2000 in Beijing and has ever since taken
place in a three-year interval, with the latest ministerial conference
taking place in July 2012 in Beijing, China. The results of the FOCAC
meetings are outlined in the Action Plans which set out the general
principles of Sino-African development, trade, and investment. In
their latest Action Plan, the partners committed themselves to con-
tinue to encourage mutual investment and to push forward negotia-
tions and implementations of bilateral agreements on promoting and
protecting investments.58
C. BRICS’s Current Investment Policy towards Africa59
The African relationship with BRICS is far more complex, in-
ternally divergent, and perhaps precarious than it may seem. The im-
NESE OUTWARD INVESTMENT: AN EMERGING POLICY PROJECTS 52, 53 (Nathalie
Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al eds., 2012).
56 OXFAM H.K., UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S OVERSEAS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
7 (2012), available at http://www.oxfam.org.cn/uploads/soft/20130428/1367136257
.pdf; Wang & Wang, Chinese Manufacturing Firm’s Overseas Direct Investment, in
RISING CHINA: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 99, 102 (Jane Golley &
Lig-ang Song eds., 2011).
57 United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., Asian Foreign Direct Investment
in Africa, supra note 3, at 54.
58 The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
Beijing Action Plan (2012–2015), FORUM ON CHINA-AF. COOPERATION, http://www
.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t954620.htm.
59 This section (with further references) is largely based on Oliver C. Ruppel &
Katharina Ruppel-Schlichting, The BRICS Partnership: Development and Climate
Change Policy from an African Perspective, in CLIMATE CHANGE: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: POLICY, DIPLOMACY AND GOVERNANCE IN A
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 549–69 (Oliver C. Ruppel, Christian Roschmann,
Katharina Ruppel-Schlichting eds., 2013).
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pact of the BRICS countries on Africa can only be correctly understood
if it is seen as part of a wider shift in the international balance of
power, both politically and economically. BRICS is emerging as an in-
tergovernmental network somewhat comparable to, for instance, the,
Group of 20 (“G20”). It functions on agenda-setting, consensus-build-
ing, policy coordination, and as a platform for knowledge production
and information exchange. So far, BRICS consists of five states with
no founding document (formal charter or treaty). This means that
there is actually no formal structure, voting procedure, or central sec-
retariat. Moreover, BRICS so far fails to provide for any mechanism to
come up with legally binding decisions, nor does it have a dispute set-
tlement procedure in place. However, the BRICS leaders have issued
several joint statements and declarations. Of particular importance
are the official documents that have resulted from the BRIC and
BRICS summits, namely:
• 2009 Joint Statement, Yekaterinburg, Russia
• 2010 Joint Statement, Brası´lia, Brazil
• 2011 Sanya Declaration, Sanya, China
• 2012 Delhi Declaration, New Delhi, India,
• 2013 eThekwini Declaration, Durban, South Africa, and
• 2014 Fortaleza Declaration, Brazil
Several other official documents have been produced by the
Summits and on the BRICS ministerial level, such as the 2011 BRICS
Agriculture Ministers Declaration or the 2011 BRICS Finance Minis-
ters Communique´. Yet, BRICS does not constitute an international or-
ganisation in the strict sense of public international law and it is yet to
be seen whether it will develop as such in the future. BRICS is neither
an international organisation nor a trade bloc in terms of a regional (or
preferential) economic community. It refers to itself as a “partnership,”
which comprises a non-hierarchical governance structure in which re-
lations among actors are repeated and enduring, but where no one has
the power to arbitrate and resolve disputes among the members. With
regards to investment policy, the Contact Group on Economic and
Trade Issues (“CGETI”) is intended to become a platform for BRICS. It
shall aim to foster trade cooperation and encourage investment links
between BRICS countries with an emphasis on sharing policy prac-
tices on trade and investment.
The Fifth BRICS Summit on 27 March 2013 in Durban, which
was hosted by South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma, took place under
the working title “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, In-
tegration and Industrialisation.”60 In their final summit declaration,
60 Fifth BRICS Summit, eThekwini Declaration, (Mar.27, 2013), http://www.brics5
.co.za/about-brics/summit-declaration/fifth-summit/.
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the leaders of the BRICS provided for a retreat together with African
leaders after the summit, under the theme, “Unlocking Africa’s poten-
tial: BRICS and Africa Cooperation on Infrastructure.”61 The retreat
was an opportunity for BRICS and African leaders to discuss how to
strengthen cooperation between the BRICS countries and the African
Continent.62 Furthermore, BRICS leaders confirmed their support for
African countries in their industrialisation process through stimulat-
ing foreign direct investment, knowledge exchange, capacity building,
and diversification of imports from Africa within the framework of the
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (“NEPAD”).63 It was ac-
knowledged that infrastructure development was of special impor-
tance for the African continent, so that BRICS will now actively “seek
to stimulate infrastructure investment on the basis of mutual benefit
to support industrial development, job-creation, skills development,
food and nutrition security and poverty eradication and sustainable
development in Africa.”64 Although China is just one of five members
of the BRICS community, this cooperation also helps to intensify trade
and investment links between China and Africa.
D. Other Relevant Legislation
In the first place, each national state has the power to regulate
FDI and to provide domestic incentive schemes in order to attract FDI.
These measures include among others tax incentives, economic
processing zones, investment promotion agencies, and investment cli-
mate assessments next to a general good-policy framework.65 How-
ever, international investment flows are also regulated by
arrangements that are multilateral or regional in nature.
1. Multilateral Investment Agreements
A multilateral investment agreement (“MIA”) regulating all
substantive aspects of FDI (comparable to the Global Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) regarding trade) was discussed intensively
during the previous decades, but was in fact never concluded due to
strong opposition by many developing states (namely India and Brazil)
and the anti-globalisation movement.66 So far, only the procedural as-
pects of international investment law are codified in a multilateral
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 5.
64 Id.
65 BROADMAN, supra note 18, at 153.
66 Anders Aslund, The World Needs a Multilateral Investment Agreement 5 (Peter-
son Inst. for Int’l Econ., Paper No. PB13-01, 2013), available at http://www.piie
.com/publications/pb/pb13-1.pdf.
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agreement—the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Convention”),
which regulates a voluntary dispute resolution system for states and
investors.67 Under the ICSID Convention, the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes was established to “provide facili-
ties for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between
Contracting States.”68 Currently the ICSID Convention has been
signed and ratified by 158 states.69 Furthermore, the WTO deals with
many aspects relating to FDI. According to paragraph twenty-six of
the Sanya Declaration, BRICS is generally committed to supporting a
strong, open, rules-based multilateral trading system embodied in the
WTO. While the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(“TRIMs”) is by far the most comprehensive agreement, certain as-
pects of FDI are also regulated in the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) and the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”), as well as the WTO Agree-
ment on Subsidies and the multilateral Government Procurement
Agreement.
2. Investment Law on the African Continent
Turning to the African continent, the African Union (“A.U.”),
which was established on the 26th of May 2001 in Addis Ababa as an
African continental union, and which consists of fifty-four African
states,70 does not have a specific strategy document focusing on invest-
ments.71 But, within the framework of the A.U., the New Partnership
for Africa’s Development (“NEPAD”) was created, which is an eco-
nomic development program that aims to provide an overarching vi-
sion and policy framework for accelerating economic co-operation and
integration among African countries.72 In its Framework Document,
NEPAD specifically recognises the importance of increasing invest-
ments to Africa as an essential component for a sustainable long-term
approach to fulfil the International Development Goals, particularly
the goal of reducing the proportion of Africans living in poverty by one
67 Monika C. E. Heymann, International Law and the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Relating to China, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L., 507, 509 (2008).
68 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes art. 1, April 2006.
69 Id.
70 Organization of African Unity (OAU)/ African Union (AU), DEP. OF INT’L REL.
& COOPERATION S. AFR., http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/oau.htm
(last visited July 19, 2014).
71 Department of Trade and Industry, Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Frame-
work Review, available at http://db3sqepoi5n3s.cloudfront.net/files/docs/090626
trade-bi-lateralpolicy.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
72 About, NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFR.’S DEV., http://www.nepad.org/about (last vis-
ited July 19, 2014).
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half.73 The NEPAD document prioritises specific areas and envisages
certain actions that are deemed to be important to attract invest-
ments. Thus, the NEPAD process has mainly an enabling function
contributing to the creation of a positive investment climate on the
African continent as a whole. Finally, most African regional communi-
ties74 developed regional investment promotion measures. These mea-
sures (regional investment policies or treaties, regional investment
promotion agencies, and investment forums) 75 aim to promote mar-
ket-friendly policies and regional integration, which can ultimately
lead to improvements in the productivity of investments.76 For exam-
ple, renewable energy certificates (“RECs”) can coordinate national in-
frastructure plans within a regional framework or can create
continental energy markets, which contributes to a positive invest-
ment climate.77
3. Bilateral Investment Treaties
Nevertheless, the main instruments governing FDI flows re-
main bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and double taxation treaties
(“DTT”). Over the last few decades the world has seen an increasing
73 New P’ship for Afr.’s Dev., NEPAD Framework Document 37 (2001), available
at http://www.nepad.org /nepad/knowledge/doc/1767/nepad-framework-document.
74 In the Abuja Treaty (which established the African Economic Community) re-
gional economic communities are seen as the “building blocks” or the basis for the
African integration. Currently there are eight of theses RECs recognised by the
AU: The Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD),
the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African
States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and finally the Southern Af-
rican Development Community (SADC). Cf. Oliver C. Ruppel, Regional Economic
Communities and Human Rights in East and Southern Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS
IN AFRICA 275-318 (Anton Boesl & Joseph Diescho eds., 2007).
75 See Meeting of the Committee of Experts of the Sixth Joint Annual Meetings of
the ECA Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic De-
velopment and AU Conference of Ministers of Economy and Finance, Abidjan,
Coˆte d’Ivoire, Mar. 21–24, 2013, Assessment of Progress on Regional Integration in
Africa, E/ECA/COE/32/3, U.N. Doc. E/ECA/COE/32/3 (Mar. 8, 2013), available at
http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/document_files/assessment-of-progress-on
-regional-integration_en_0.pdf; Protocol of Finance and Investment, Annex 1, Aug.
18, 2006, available at http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/1009 (en-
tered into force Apr. 14, 2010)
76 China and Regional Integration as Drivers of Structural Transformation in Af-
rica, S. AFR. FOREIGN POL’Y INACTIVATE, http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2013/
china-and-regional-integration-drivers-structural-transformation-africa (last vis-
ited July 22, 2014).
77 Id.
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proliferation of BITs and DDTs, indicating a growing competition for
FDI.78 While DTTs provide foreign investors with tax-issue security,
stability, and hinder double taxation of corporate incomes, BITs en-
courage and facilitate investment flows through liberalisation and pro-
tection of foreign investment.79 They are defined as agreements that
protect investments by investors of one state in the terri-
tory of another state by articulating substantive rules
governing the host state’s treatment of the investment
and by establishing dispute resolution mechanism appli-
cable to alleged violations of those rules.80
Presently, BITs show a “considerable uniformity,”81 with some consti-
tuting principles regarding the substantive and procedural protection
of foreign investment. Salacuse identifies in total nine topics that are
covered by almost all international investment treaties:
(1) [D]efinitions and scope of application; (2) investment
promotion and conditions for the entry of foreign invest-
ments and investors; (3) general standards for the treat-
ment of foreign investors and investments; (4) monetary
transfers; (5) expropriation and dispossession; (6) opera-
tional and other conditions; (7) losses from armed conflict
or internal disorder; (8) treaty exceptions, modifications,
and terminations; and (9) dispute settlement.82
With regards to standards of treatment, one can distinguish
between absolute and relative standards of treatment. While the latter
defines the required treatment to be granted to investment by refer-
ence to the treatment accorded to other investments, absolute stan-
dards are non-contingent.83 Relative standards of treatment include
the “national treatment” and the “most-favoured-nation” principle.84
In their typical versions, the national treatment clause demands that
foreign investors should not be treated worse than domestic inves-
tors,85 while the most-favoured nation principle means that privileges
provided to one foreign investor must be provided to all.86 Absolute
78 Kragelund, supra note 24, at 8.
79 Id.
80 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economic of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41
HARV. INT’L L.J. 469 (2000).
81 Berger, supra note 7, at 4.
82 Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV.
INT’L L.J., 427, 432 (2010).
83 OECD, International Investment Law: A Changing Landscape 74, (2005).
84 Id.
85 Rudolf Dolzer, Symp. Making The Most of International Investment Agreements:
A Common Agenda National Treatment: New Developments (Dec. 12, 2005).
86 Broadman, supra note 23, at 8.
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standards of treatment that are utilised in BITs usually include the
international minimum standard of treatment, the “fair and equitable
standard of treatment” (“FET standard”) and “full protection and
security.”87
4. Sino-African BITs
In general it can be observed that the number of Chinese BITs
has been constantly rising as the Chinese economy has become more
powerful.88 China only started concluding BITs in 1982 (when the first
BIT was signed with Sweden) and mainly focused on developed, capi-
tal-exporting countries as contracting partners in the first few years.89
The main goal of its investment policy in the early years was to pro-
mote IFDI, rather than protect OFDI.90 However, as of June 2013,
China had concluded 131 BITs and is thus ranked second after Ger-
many in terms of the total number of BITs concluded worldwide.91 On
the African continent China has concluded over 30 BITs as of 2013.92
When analysing the Chinese BITs concluded with the African
countries, one of the remarkable features of the Sino-African BITs is
the fact that they do not follow the normal BIT pattern—that they are
concluded between a capital-exporting developed state and a develop-
ing state keen to attract capital, but between two developing countries.
This category of BIT is generally known as the South-South BIT.93
However, the Sino-African BITs contain all standard provisions found
in global BIT practice, like a preamble stating the intentions of the
contracting parties, definitions of investment and investors, as well as
87 SORNARAJAH, supra note 39, at 233.
88 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., GLOBAL INVESTMENT TRENDS
MONITOR, supra note 3, at 54–56.
89 Wenhua Shan & Nora Gallagher, China 132, in COMMENTARY ON SELECTED
MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES (Chester Brown ed., 2013).
90 Id.
91 United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev, Full List of Bilateral Investment
Agreements Concluded, 1 June 2013, http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/
bits_china.pdf.
92 With Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Dji-
bouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mada-
gascar, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
South Africa, Sudan, Seychelles, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See id.
93 See, e.g., MALIK MAHNAZ, IV ANNUAL FORUM FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRY INV.
NEGOTIATORS BACKGROUND PAPERS NEW DELHI, OCT. 27–29, 2010, SOUTH-SOUTH
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: THE SAME OLD STORY? (2010), available at http:/
/www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/dci_2010_south_bits.pdf; United Nations Conference on
Trade & Dev., South-South Investment Agreements Proliferating, INT’L INVEST-
MENT AGREEMENTS MONITOR, no. 5, 2005, available at http://bit.escwa.org.lb/CM-
SPages/GetFile.aspx?nodeguid=2e36f350-c502-43a2-8afb-cf2b5215fe46.
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certain subjective and procedural investment protection provisions.
The main reason for this is certainly that the dynamic of the compara-
tively more developed southern countries versus the lesser-developed
southern treaty partner mirrors that of the north-south dynamic.94
In general, all Sino-African BITs adopted the admission model.
This means that the treaty provides investment protection only after
the admission of the FDI project.95 The admission model is opposed to
the pre-establishment model (the screening power of the state is al-
ready restricted in the pre-establishment phase) that has been applied
by the U.S., Canada, and Japan in their BIT practices.96 When consid-
ering Chinese investment policies, one always has to bear in mind that
China started as a capital-importing state and was therefore rather
inclined to protect its sovereign right to regulate foreign investment.97
Ever since the volume of its OFDI increased rapidly, China began to
adopt a more liberal approach by trying to increase the legal protection
of its own investment.98 This also has an influence on Sino-African in-
vestment practice.
One of the most important goals of a BIT is obviously to pro-
mote investments. Thus, every BIT usually contains a provision that
specifically reiterates this goal. However, most Sino-African BITs tend
to leave the control and protection of the admission to the discretion of
the host country (“in accordance with its laws and regulations”),99
showing that there is still some reluctance to liberalize existing invest-
ment regimes. In the following subparagraphs, the treaties usually go
into more detail and call for assistance and the provision of facilities
for obtaining visa and work permits, as well as other necessary per-
mits,100 licence agreements, and contracts for technical, commercial,
or administrative assistance. These provisions are of special impor-
tance within the Sino-African context because one of the greatest im-
pediments to trade and investment on the African continent are the
non-tariff barriers (“NTB”), like delays of customs clearance proce-
dures, complex documentation requirements, and unpredictable proce-
dures at the border.101 Especially measures that relate to entry and
establishment, like bans on foreign investment in certain sectors,
94 Mahnaz, supra note 93, at 3.
95 Berger, supra note 7, at 4.
96 Id.
97 Congyan Cai, Outward Foreign Direct Investment Protection and the Effective-
ness of Chinese BIT Practice, 7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 621, 626 (2006).
98 Berger, supra note 7, at 1.
99 See, e.g., China- South Africa BIT (1997) art. 2 (1).
100 See, e.g., China- South Africa BIT (1997) art. 2 (2).
101 Karin Hasse, Non-Tariff Barrier Choke African Trade, 8 J. GOOD GOVERANCE
AFR. 5 (2013), available at http://gga.org/publications/africa-in-fact-february-2013-
trade.
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screening, and approval requirements; measures that deal with own-
ership and control, like compulsory joint ventures, transfer of technol-
ogy, or managerial know-how; and finally, operational measures, like
performance requirements, operational permits or licences, or local
content restrictions can become impediments to international invest-
ments.102 At least to some extent the Sino-African BITs can serve as a
remedy to non-tariff barriers as they provide for assistance for ob-
taining necessary permits, licence agreements, and contracts for tech-
nical, commercial, or administrative assistance.103 Also, the general
commitment to encourage FDI flows can be seen as an incentive to
abolish certain NTBs.
With regards to absolute standards of treatment, all Sino-Afri-
can BITs include a provision reiterating the principle of fair and equi-
table treatment.104 But notably these provisions do not contain any
reference to the international minimum standard of treatment105 or
full protection and security.106 With regards to the relative standards
of treatment, China rarely included the standard of national treat-
ment in its BIT practice before 1998. Berger argues that the main rea-
son for this was the aim to protect “infant industries and especially
state-owned enterprises from foreign companies’ competition.”107 Most
Chinese BITs offered the standard of most-favoured-nation treatment
only.108 But with the changing circumstances, China now being a capi-
102 MICHAEL V. GESTRIN, A Stocktaking of Investment-Related Barriers in Africa 3
(OECD-Africa Round-table), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment
fordevelopment/21040978.pdf.
103 Bilateral Investment Agreement, China-S. Afr., art. 2, ¶3, Dec. 30, 1997.
104 See e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, Benin-China, art. 3, ¶1, Feb. 18, 2004,
available at http://www.aseanbriefing.com/userfiles/resources-pdfs/China/BIT/
Asia_BIT_Benin_China.pdf.; Agreement on Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ment, China-Bots., art. 3, June 12, 2000, available at http://investmentpolicyhub
.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/500; Agreement on the Promotion Protection of
Investments, China-Cote d’Ivoire, art. 3 (1), Sep. 30, 2002, available at http://www
.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/abtgotprocatgotrocdotpapoi1477/; Agreement on the
Reciprocal Promotion Protection of Investments, China-Uganda, art. 3, May 27,
2004, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/
790.
105 An exception is a China-Seychelles Bilateral Investment Treaty signed in
2007. See Berger, supra note 8, at 10 (explaining that China traditionally rejected
customary international law as a Western concept).
106 Again exceptions apply. See e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty Agreement,
China-Madag., art. 5 (1), Nov. 21, 2005, available at http://www.aseanbriefing
.com/userfiles/resources-pdfs/China/BIT/Asia_BIT_Madagascar_China.pdf.
107 Berger, supra note 7, at 8.
108 See e.g., Agreement Concerning the Enforcement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, China-Ghana, art. 3, Oct. 12, 1989, available at http://tfs.mofcom
.gov.cn/aarticle/h/aw/201002/20100206778950.html; China-South Africa BIT, art.
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tal-exporting country, it also gradually gave up its reservations. In
most Sino-African BITs a provision granting nation treatment is now
included but accompanied by the phrase “without prejudices to its
laws and regulation,” thereby restricting it to a best effort clause.109
National treatment is thus not granted unless the host countries’ laws
and regulations grant foreign investors treatment not less favourable
than that accorded to domestic investors. Other Sino-African BITs in-
clude a paragraph allowing for national treatment,110 but in a sepa-
rate protocol China reserves the right to maintain laws and
regulations towards foreign investors that are incompatible with na-
tional treatment.111 Only the BIT with the Seychelles in fact grants
full national treatment without any further restrictions.112
In line with its changing attitude towards national treatment,
China only recently started to grant unrestricted access to interna-
tional arbitration.113 When China became a Contracting State of the
ICSID Convention in 1993,114 it continued to conclude BITs without
making explicit reference to ICSID arbitration.115 Nowadays such a
provision can be found in most Sino-African BITs. There is no require-
ment to exhaust local remedies first and the submission of the dispute
to the arbitral tribunal is not dependent on the consent of both parties.
The only restriction that still exists is the refusal to grant the right to
transnational arbitration once the investor has chosen to access the
host country’s domestic judiciary and the requirement to conduct an
administrative review procedure. This raised the question “whether
the newly concluded Chinese BITs containing an ICSID clause may
have effects on earlier BITs without such a clause through the applica-
tion of the most-favoured-nation clause.”116 Case law on the question
of the application of the most-favoured-nation clause to procedural
rights is contradictory: While in the Maffezini case a tribunal applied
3 (3), which remarkably only provides for national treatment by the Republic of
South Africa. So while Chinese authorities are still allowed to discriminate South
African investors, Chinese investors can rely on national treatment provisions.
109 Berger, supra note 8, at 12.
110 China-Uganda BIT, supra note 106, art. 3, ¶ 2; China-Cote d’Ivoire, supra note
105, art. 3, ¶ 2.
111 Berger, supra note 8, at 9.
112 Bilateral Investment Agreement, China-Seychelles, art.3, ¶ 2, Oct. 2, 2007,
available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/188/treaty/966.
113 Berger, supra note 8, at 10.
114 INT’L CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISP. [ICSID], List of Con-
tracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention, ICSID (Apr. 11, 2014),
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSID
DocRH&actionVal=Contractingstates&ReqFrom=Main.
115 China-South Africa BIT, supra note 103.
116 Heymann, supra note 67, at 519.
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the most-favoured-nation clause to dispute resolution provisions (in
fact to a procedural waiting period),117 more recent case law explicitly
rejected this line of thought with regards to invoking ICSID jurisdic-
tion.118 Only recently in 2007 did a Chinese company log the first arbi-
tration request,119 and it was not before 2011 that the first claim was
filed against China under the ICSID Convention.120
Finally, China is well aware of the unstable region it deals with
and is especially aware of the fact that its outward FDI can face con-
siderable political risks. Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the regions that
has experienced a rising trend of conflicts during the past couple of
decades.121 While some of these civil wars are a result of the ethnic
and religious diversity, some of the main factors contributing to the
instability of the continent are “the high levels of poverty, failed politi-
cal institutions and economic dependence on natural resources.” 122 In-
vestors coming to the African continent, of course, have to be prepared
for this and this is especially true for China who has been heavily en-
gaged in many African conflict areas as well as post-war countries like
Sierra Leone, Angola, or the Sudan.123 To safeguard its FDI, some
BITs with African countries therefore include a provision providing for
national treatment (and not only the regular most-favoured-nation
treatment) in the case of war and civil strife.124
117 Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tribunal on Ob-
jections to Jurisdiction (Jan. 25, 2000).
118 Plasma Consortium Ltd. v. Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Ju-
risdiction (Feb. 8, 2005).
119 Victor Pey Casado & President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, Pend-
ing Case, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontSer-
vlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending (last visited Feb. 26,
2014).
120 See ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (last visited Feb.
28, 2014).
121 According to a study conducted by Elbadawi & Sambanis “over the last 40
years nearly 20 African countries (or about 40% of Sub-Saharan Africa) have ex-
perienced at least one period of civil war. See Ibrahim Elbadawi & Nicholas
Sambanis, Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa?, 9 J. AFR. ECON. 244
(2000).
122 Id. at 244, 254.
123 Daniel Large, China’s Involvement in Armed Conflict and Post-War Recon-
struction in Africa: Sudan in Comparative Context, in OIL DEVELOPMENT IN AF-
RICA: LESSONS FOR SUDAN AFTER THE COMPREHENSION PEACE AGREEMENT 62 (L.
Patey ed. 2000).
124 China-Bots. BIT (2000) art. 3 (2).
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II. EVALUATION OF CHINESE INVESTMENT POLICIES TOWARDS AFRICA
A. General Evaluation of the Investments
Especially large Chinese infrastructure projects like the build-
ing of dams, hospitals, government offices, stadiums, and streets
throughout Africa are at the forefront of public attention.125 But, apart
from these very obvious accomplishments of Chinese engagement on
the continent, the Chinese demand stimulated raw material prices in-
creasing the income of many African countries and promoting African
industries.126 African countries gained more choices for business part-
ners and export markets, turning away from the dominion and depen-
dence from the West.127 This is especially true because the ordinary
customer profits from cheap Chinese goods, which are affordable for
large parts of the population and thus help to develop the consumer
sector across the continent.128 African governments appreciate that
Chinese engagement comes with no “strings attached,” meaning that
China does not want to impose certain values on its African partners
as do many Western-dominated international financial institutions
with their foreign aid and debt relief programmes.129 In this regard,
the China-Africa Development Fund is becoming an appealing alterna-
tive to traditional sources of funding.130 However, there is also a down-
side to the Chinese presence on the African continent. In fact, it did
not bring good to the continent in terms of environmental concerns,
human rights, and economic development.
First of all, the strong reliance upon raw materials like oil and
the resulting dependency on export revenues from the extracting sec-
tor is highly problematic (the so called “resource curse”).131 Natural
resource investments are often very capital-intensive with standard-
ized processes only creating modest spill-overs on local labour and
technologies.132 It must be feared that governments refrain from ini-
tialising necessary political and economic reforms like investment in
human capital and infrastructure, institutional reforms, structural di-
125 Taylor, supra note 25, at 951.
126 Li Anshan, China’s New Policy Toward Africa, in CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE,
AID, INFLUENCE 39 (Robert I. Rotberg ed. 2008).
127 Id.
128 Daniel Flynn, Africa Investment, China Brings Goods and Roads, Now Africa
Wants Jobs, REUTERS, (July 21, 2013) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/21/
africa-china-idUSL6N0FI3TE20130721 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
129 Ana Christina Alves, Making Sense of Chinese Oil Investment in Africa, in
CHINA’S RETURN TO AFRICA 84 (Chris Alden ed. 2008).
130 Habiyaremye, supra note 19, at 90.
131 Id. at 82.
132 Miria A. Pigato, The Foreign Direct Investment Environment in Africa 3, avail-
able at www.worldbank.org/afr/wps/wp15.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
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versification, and technology accumulation, which are crucial for an
employment-intensive and inclusive growth.133 Other negative side ef-
fects of the over-reliance on the export of raw materials are the vulner-
ability to the vitality of the international commodity markets,134 the
possible misallocation of revenue incomes in governmental budgets,
corruption practices, environmental degradation, and sometimes even
violent conflicts.135 While this problem is not a specific feature of the
Sino-African trade, Chinese companies generally keep downstream
and processing activities within China, only importing pure raw
materials,136 as labour market efficiency is currently still higher in
China than in Africa.137 Ultimately, this means “the jobs and wealth
from processing the natural resources are created elsewhere.”138 And
even on the worksites in Africa where they could employ local workers,
Chinese enterprises tend to employ Chinese workers.139
All of this contributes to the general perception that the Sino-
African investment relations might not be sustainable in the long
run.140 The Chinese government and many enterprises are well aware
of these resentments and work on changing this perception.141 The Af-
rican partners on the other hand ultimately have to initialise the nec-
essary political and economic reforms to be able to attract investments
in areas other than in the natural resource sector. Currently, African
countries should look for opportunities to make the existing invest-
ment relationships more beneficial for the local economies. They could,
for example, demand that investors have to meet certain criteria, that
they use domestic inputs such as labour and supplies, that they trans-
fer technology, or train local workers.142 Also, governments should
seek options to keep down-stream activities in the country after the
133 Deutsche Bank Research, China’s Commodity Hunger: Implications for Africa
and Latin America 12, http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_DE-
PROD/PROD0000000000199956.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
134 Taylor, supra note 25, at 951.
135 Habiyaremye, supra note 19, at 84.
136 Deutsche Bank Research, supra note 133, at 12.
137 Frans Crul, China and South Africa on Their Way to Sustainable Trade Rela-
tions 10 (Tralac Working Paper 2013).
138 Flynn, supra note 128.
139 Crul, supra note 137, at 8.
140 Id. at 2.
141 Tongkeh Joseph Fowale, Third World Order vs. New World Order, POLITI-
CALARTICLES.NET, http://www.politicalarticles.net/blog/2008/04/27/third-world-or
der-vs-new-world-order-sino-african-economic-cooperation-challenges-to-globalisa
tion/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
142 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY (South Africa), Bilateral Investment
Treaty Policy Framework Review 48, http://db3sqepoi5n3s.cloudfront.net/files/
docs/090626trade-bi-lateralpolicy.pdf (accessed Feb. 28, 2014) [hereinafter DTI].
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initial investment is made. Only then will the Sino-African partner-
ship become sustainable in the long run.
Second, especially with regards to labour rights, Chinese com-
panies faced much criticism in recent years. Chinese employers were
accused of “tense labour relations, hostile attitudes towards trade un-
ions, various violations of workers’ rights, poor working conditions and
several instances of discrimination and unfair treatment.”143 Further-
more, they were heavily criticized for their policies concerning mini-
mum wage as well as flooding the African market with low quality
goods.144 With regards to working conditions, Chinese investors are
supposed to ignore certain safety and health regulation,145 underpay
workers, and break promises with regards to wage increases.146 Pri-
marily it is of course the responsibility of the local governments to
make sure that Chinese companies comply with international and lo-
cal labour laws and regulations. Most African countries enacted quite
detailed and strict labour legislations,147 ranging from regulations on
general conditions of employment, which deal with ordinary hours of
work as well as leave and termination of employment, and more spe-
cific legislation (e.g. South Africa’s Amended Occupational Health and
Safety Act (No. 85 of 1993) and South Africa’s Employment Equity Act
(No. 55 of 1998)).
On an international level, the International Labour Organiza-
tion, as the main international body responsible for promoting social
justice and internationally recognized labour rights,148 formulated cer-
tain international labour standards.149 Topics that are covered by the
189 ILO Conventions are for example the Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87 of 1948), the
Occupational Safety and Health Convention (No. 155 of 1981), the
Safety and Health in Mines Convention (No. 176 of 1995), and the
143 African Labour Research Network, Chinese Investments in Africa: Opportunity
or Threat for Workers 32–38, http://www.worldlabour.org/chi/files/u1/China-Africa
_Booklet_2009.pdf (last visited Feb. 02, 2014).
144 Habiyaremye, supra note 19, at 88.
145 Nick Kotch, Zambia Seizes Chinese Mine Over Safety, available at http://www
.bdlive.co.za/business/mining/2013/02/21/zambia-seizes-chinese-mine-over-safety
(last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
146 Horand Knaup, Chinas Rolle in Afrika: Ansturm der gierigen Helfer, available
at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/chinas-rolle-in-afrika-ansturm-der-gier-
igen-helfer-a-728609.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
147 South African Labour Law legislations are available at the website of the De-
partment of Labour, see http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/legislation (last visited
Feb. 26, 2014); see Amended Basic Conditions of Employment Act (No. 75 of 1997).
148 INT’L LAB. ORG. (ILO), Mission and Objectives, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-
the-ilo/mission-and-objectives/lang—en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
149 Id.
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Minimum Wage Fixing Convention (No. 131 of 1970).150 Often, other
international or regional institutions adopted the standards contained
in these conventions in their own labour law provisions. Thus, it is
crucial to enable the responsible government agencies to rigorously en-
force (international and local) labour standards in order to ensure the
improvement of working conditions. Also, it is important that African
governments in this regard do not give in, but instead defend labour
rights against Chinese investors not fearing the withdrawal of invest-
ment revenues from the country.151
Third, the fact that Chinese economic relations are based on
the concept of a no-strings policy or policy of non-interference is highly
problematic with regards to human rights and democracy.152 Espe-
cially China’s engagement in Zimbabwe and Darfur has been largely
criticized.153 The main accusation is that China, in order to gain access
to raw materials, supports corrupt, authoritarian regimes at the ex-
pense of human rights.154 As put in a Human Rights Report regarding
the situation in the Sudan, “China provided financial and military
support to the Sudanese government even as it was engaged in mas-
sive ethnic cleansing in Darfur.”155 Indirectly, China’s activities inter-
fere with rights that are codified in documents such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child.156 In an African context, the African (Banjul) Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights is also important to mention. Rights that
are affected are “the right to life, liberty and security of person,”157 the
150 INT’L LAB. ORG. (ILO) Ratification by Convention, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/nor-
mlex/en/f?p=1000:12001:0::NO (last visited July 19, 2014).
151 See Kotch, supra note 145 (referring to the election campaign of Zambian pres-
ident Michael Sata in 2011).
152 TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 952.
153 AFRICAN LABOUR RESEARCH NETWORK, supra note 143, at 21.
154 Li Anshan, China and Africa: Policy and Challenges, 3 CHINA SECURITY 69, 83
(2007).
155 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 25 (2006), available at http://www.hrw
.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2006.pdf.
156 Statement Delivered by Michael W. Inlander on Behalf of United Nations
Watch to the 11th Session of UN Working Group On Minorities: Sudan’s Mass
Displacement, Rape, and Killing of Black African Minority in Darfur Constitutes
Gross Violation of UN Declaration on the Rights of Minorities (June 1, 2005),
http://www.unwatch.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=bdKKISNqEmG&b=
1313923&ct=1747993.
157 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 3, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights art. 4, adopted  June 27, 1984, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
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right to be free of “torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading punish-
ment,”158 and the “right to freedom of movement.”159 Of course, it is
important to acknowledge that China only enables a situation in
which these human right violations are possible and cannot be made
responsible for them in the first place. Also, it is important to notice
that China’s position of non-interference, for example with regard to
Zimbabwe, is in accord with that of the AU160 and that lately, for ex-
ample in Darfur, China assumed a more active role trying to mediate
between the Sudanese government and other actors.161 However, be-
ing one of the largest investors in many unstable and crisis-ridden
countries, the Chinese could have done more “to exercise their growing
ability to be a persuasive and responsible stakeholder.”162
Finally, Chinese investors are engaging in many projects on
the African continent like hydropower dams, concessions for tropical
hardwood, large rainforest plantations, roads, as well as large-scale
mining, which poses a significant risk for the environment in Africa.163
Against this background, Chinese companies have been accused of vio-
lating environmental rights of the local communities where they oper-
ate. The Niger Delta, for example, was once Nigeria’s richest area of
biodiversity but now suffers from severe environmental degradation
caused in part by frequent oil spills and dumping of industrial
waste.164 There are now many international agreements that acknowl-
edge the right to a clean and healthy environment such as the Univer-
sal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948 (Art. 25), the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007 (Art. 29), and
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Art. 24). Notewor-
thy in the Chinese-African investment context are the 1973 Conven-
tion on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES), the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity, and the 1998
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal. For a long time China did not have envi-
158 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 157, art. 5; African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 157, art. 5.
159 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 157, art. 13; African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 157, art. 12.
160 Anshan, supra note 154, at 75.
161 Id. at 76–77; see also Bates Gill & James Reilly, The Tenuous Hold of China
Inc. in Africa, 30 THE WASH. Q., no. 3, 2007, at 37.
162 DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY CHINA IN AFRICA
292 (2011).
163 Id. at 299.
164 Habiyaremye, supra note 19, at 80.
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ronmental laws that specifically related to OFDI.165 The first guide-
lines that specifically addressed environmental issues were guidelines
concerning social and environmental impact assessments issued by
China’s EXIM Bank in 2008.166 In March 2013, the MOFCOM and the
Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), as a next step, jointly
issued the Guidelines on Environmental Protection in Investment and
Cooperation Overseas (“Guideline on Environmental Protection”).167
But with no sanctions for violations of the guidelines and without
much civil society activism, it will be difficult to actually hold Chinese
investors accountable.168
B. Evaluation of the Sino-African BIT Practice
Lately, the effectiveness of BITs as a means to attract interna-
tional investments has been called into question.169 As statistics show,
there are many investors and host states that totally refrain from the
conclusion of BIT.170 Thus, it is highly disputed whether BITs can
serve as substitutes for good institutional quality and local property
rights and thereby promote FDI inflows.171 However, China and its
165 OXFAM H.K., Understanding China’s Overseas Foreign Direct Investiment: A
Mapping of Chinese Laws and Stakeholders 26 (2012), available at http://www
.oxfam.org.cn/uploads/soft/20130428/1367136257.pdf.
166 BRAUTIGAM, supra note 162, at 303.
167 Guidelines on Environmental Protection in Investment and Cooperation Over-
seas, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE CHINA, (Mar. 1, 2013, 7:28 PM), http://english.mof
com.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/bbb/201303/20130300043226.shtml.
168 See BRAUTIGAM, supra note 162, at 301 (referring to China’s State Forestry
Administration and the Ministry of Commerce guidelines which Chinese logging
companies are expected to use abroad).
169 See Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI?
Only a Bit . . . and They Could Bite 22 (The World Bank Policy Research Working
Papers, 2003), available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-
9450-3121; Berger, supra note 7, at 2.
170 See Hallward-Driemeier, supra note 169, at 9 (stating that Japan, the second
largest source for FDI by the turn of last century, had only concluded 4 BITs up to
2003. Likewise Brazil, which is one of the top receivers of FDI, has only signed a
couple of investments agreements none of which entered into force).
171 See generally Matthias Busse et al., FDI Promotion through Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties 24–25 (Kiel Inst. for the World Econ., Working Paper No. 1403,
2008); Hallward-Driemeier, supra note 169, at 22; Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess,
Do Bilateral Investments Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Develop-
ing Countries, 33 WORLD DEV., no. 10, Oct. 2005, at 27, available at http://
eprints.lse.ac.uk/627/1/World_Dev_%28BITs%29.pdf; Susan Rose-Ackerman &
Jennifer Tobin, Foreign Direct Investment and Business Environment in Develop-
ing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties 23 (Yale Law Sch. Ctr.
for Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 293, 2005), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=557121.
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respective African partners committed themselves to continue to en-
courage mutual investment and to push forward negotiations and im-
plementations of bilateral agreements on promoting and protecting
investments.172 This commitment is strong proof for the factual ac-
ceptance of BITs as an instrument to foster mutual investment. Espe-
cially in the last decade there has been a massive rise in the number of
BITs concluded with African countries,173 showing that China and the
African countries seem to believe that international law is an adequate
protection for its investors in third-world countries.174 Nevertheless,
Sino-African BITs pose serious and not yet anticipated risks especially
to the African continent.
First of all, most investment agreements focus primarily on
protecting the interests of the foreign investor and do not take into
account the interesst of the international community or the host state
with regards to the protections of such areas as human rights or the
environment.175 Sino-African BITs do not address human rights or en-
vironmental issues at all. Considering international BIT practice, this
is in fact not unusual as there are only a few, newer investment trea-
ties (see for example Art. 1114 (1) of the North American Free Trade
Agreement or the China-Canada BIT of 2011) that contain special pro-
visions addressing these issues. However, it would be possible to in-
clude special exception clauses to general treaty provisions or to make
a reference to human rights concerns and environmental aspects in
the preambles of the BITs.176 Although a preamble does not impose
enforceable rights on the contracting parties, it has to be taken into
account when interpreting a treaty according to Article 31 of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Going even one step further,
it would be an option to impose direct obligations on the investors
themselves, such as a requirement to comply with the investment laws
of the host state when making and operating an investment or obliga-
tions in the post-operation stage (e.g. environmental cleanup).177 How-
ever, so far only few BITs (like the COMESA Investment Agreement
2007, Art. 13) contain specific investor obligations.
172 FOCAC, supra note 58, at 4.2.2.
173 See United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., Full List of Bilateral Invest-
ment Agreements Concluded, 1 June 2013, http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/
docs/bits_china.pdf  (last visited July 19, 2014).
174 Heymann, supra note 67, at 526.
175 SORNARAJAH, supra note 39, at 259.
176 See Dep’t of Trade & Indus., S. Afr., supra note 142, at 49.
177 DIV. ON INV. & ENTER., UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., In-
vestment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development 39 (n.d.), available at
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2012d6_en.pdf (last visited
July 19, 2014).
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Second, many African countries have enacted ethnic policies
(land redistribution and other schemes) to support those parts of their
population that have been disadvantaged due to racial reasons in the
past.178 These policies have a potential to conflict with the BITs in
case they include national treatment standards that may require that
the best national standards are also given to the foreign investors.179
Obviously, these provisions that favour the disadvantaged of the com-
munity are not meant to fall under the scope of an investment
treaty.180 To avoid this problem, specific exception clauses should be
included in all BITs.181 The national treatment standard can further-
more conflict with performance requirements, which are imposed upon
an investor by the host state. Usually a host state in its sovereign
power can demand that the investor has to meet certain criteria, for
example that he use domestic inputs such as labour and supplies.182
According to the national treatment clause, host countries cannot give
national investors any preferential treatments over foreign investors
once they are established in the country and require specific corporate
behaviour.183 With regards to the Chinese practice of refraining from
hiring local workers, here the BITs certainly act as a constraint on the
government’s regulatory freedom.
Third, an emerging principle of International Law, which is
often employed in the international trade context, is the principle of
special and differential treatment, meaning that developing countries
profit from special rights (e.g. longer periods to phase in obligations
and more lenient obligations).184 Expressions of this principle can be
found in many international agreements, but rarely in international
investment agreements and accordingly not in Sino-African BITs, as
bilateral agreements are usually based on “legal symmetry and reci-
procity.”185 However, the principle could easily be included through
development-focused exceptions from general commitments, a develop-
ment-oriented interpretation of treaty obligations by arbitral tribu-
nals, or through best endeavour commitments for developing
178 See Basic Guide to Affirmative Action, DEP. OF LAB. S. AFR., http://www.labour
.gov.za/DOL/legislation/acts/basic-guides/basic-guide-to-affirmative-action (Last
visited July 19, 2014).
179 SORNARAJAH, supra note 39, at 261.
180 Id.
181 See DTI, supra note 142, at 37.
182 DTI, supra note 142, at 48.
183 Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, supra note 177, at
40.
184 See Definition of the WTO, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
glossary_e/s_d_e.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
185 Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, supra note 177, at
42.
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countries.186 Surely it would be a very progressive step for the Sino-
African BITs practice to adopt the special and differential treatment
standard, which is unlikely to happen before other key players in the
international investment scene start incorporating it as well.
Fourth, with regards to expropriation, the Sino-African BITs
use terms like expropriation or nationalisation that can be found in
most standard BITs nowadays. But, what constitutes an expropriation
remains unclear and no further definition can be found in any BIT.
The same applies to the obligation of “fair and equitable” treatment,
which can be found in basically all Sino-African BITs, but does not
connote a clear set of legal orders and obligations.187 Thus, to the ex-
tent that foreign investors perceive domestic policy changes to nega-
tively affect their expectations, they might use these provisions to
challenge government’s measure and claim for compensation.188 It
might be advisable for the African countries against this background
to clarify the scope and meaning of the expropriation provisions as well
as the fair and equitable treatment clause or to include exception and
reservation clauses.189
Finally, the dispute settlement clauses of BITs are highly con-
troversial with regards to the potential risks they pose to the host
state. Some argue that investors take advantage of these provisions to
circumvent domestic legal systems in order to take their cases to more
favourable international arbitration.190 Here, many states fear that is-
sues of public policy are not addressed as comprehensively and pru-
dently as they should.191 As Chinese investment to the continent
grows, also grows the potential for conflicts. Just recently Addax, a
Chinese refiner owned by the Sinopec group, sought US $330 million
in damages from Gabon in the ICC International Court of Arbitration
in Paris, triggering a counterclaim of the Gabon state for double that
amount.192 The dispute mainly focused on the government’s allega-
tions that Addax failed to pay customs duties and respect other
laws,193 while Addax blamed Gabon for not renewing its licence.194
186 Id.
187 Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET): Interactions with
other Standards, 4 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 26 (2007).
188 Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, supra note 177, at
40.
189 Id.
190 DTI, supra note 142, at 45.
191 Id.
192 Emma Farge, China’s Addax Locks in $ 1 Billion Dispute with Gabon-Sources,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/05/gabon-china-idUSL5N0E93DB201306
05 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
193 Flynn, supra note 128.
194 Farge, supra note 192.
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CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding all the criticism, China’s engagement in Af-
rica certainly contributes to Africa’s economic development and can
help to open up the continent and make business more competitive.
The cooperation of BRICS members with African nations provides an
enormous potential for development of the continent, especially as
China attaches an ever-increasing importance to BRICS and its Africa
relations. BRICS had a challenging 2013 and is expected to also have a
challenging 2014. Critics state that the BRICS have hit a wall in
which major emerging markets are suffering.195 Nevertheless, in 2013
BRICS-Africa trade amounted to nearly $350 billion, which is a signifi-
cant amount for Africa in relation to its other trading blocs, constitut-
ing a 5% increase from 2012.196
Chinese investments, in particular, have been growing tremen-
dously during the last decade with the main focus on resource-rich
countries like Sudan, Nigeria, and Zambia, as well as South Africa as
the leading African economy. Not only is China interested in the raw
materials that the African continent has to offer, but it also seeks to
exploit Africa’s potential as an emerging market with an immense con-
sumer base.
However, it is not certain that Africa profits from Chinese in-
vestments. As shown above, the Chinese investments on the continent
can also lead to negative side effects such as negative implications for
human rights, labour law, and for the environment, as well as detri-
ments for the local economies. From an economic perspective, the sus-
tainability of Chinese investments is very questionable. Most Chinese
investments still go into the natural resource sector with the result
that many countries are becoming more and more dependent on these
resources. If African countries want to make their investment rela-
tions with China more sustainable, it is essential that they attract in-
vestment in other areas as well. With regards to existing investment,
African countries should place more emphasis on performance require-
ments, for example the participation of local workers in these invest-
ment projects, technology transfers, and training of local workers, and
should also try to keep the labour-intensive down-stream activities in
their respective home countries.
Regarding human rights violations, environmental abuse, and
alleged labour law abuse, the onus is placed on the individual African
countries. It is crucial that they build up capacities to monitor compli-
195 Cf. Michael Schuman, The BRICs Have Hit the Wall, available at http://
business.time.com/2014/01/10/brics-in-trouble/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
196 Cf. Sapa, BRICS Economies Not Crashing: Economist, available at http://www
.sabc.co.za/news/a/a9c37e0042a6ffa1b579ff56d5ffbd92/Brics-economies-not-crash
ing:Economist-20142201 (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).
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ance and to safeguard the enforcement of respective regulation. In this
context it might be advantageous for the African countries to slowly
get into a position where they can choose who they want to do business
with in the future.
With regards to the Sino-African BIT practice, it might be ad-
visable that the older BITs that were concluded at the turn of the cen-
tury be revised and renegotiated. One recommendation might be to
include more specific language that emphasises the fact that invest-
ment promotion and protection should not undermine other important
values such as human rights, environmental concerns, and labour con-
cerns, and that investments should always promote sustainable devel-
opment. More clarification is also needed with regards to such
provisions as those dealing with expropriation or fair and equitable
treatment. There is still a lot of room for improvement especially with
regards to recent developments in international investment treaty de-
sign (e.g. the inclusions of investors’ obligations and the adoption of
the principle of special and differential treatment). Bearing these rec-
ommendations in mind, Sino-African investments might become sus-
tainable in the long-run and will be beneficial for China and the
African continent at large.
